Seeing Spatially: People, Networks and Movements in Digital and Urban Spaces by Lim, M. (Merlyna)
IDPR, 36 (1) 2014 doi:10.3828/idpr.2014.4
Merlyna Lim is Distinguished Scholar of  Technology and Public Engagement at Arizona State University’s School of  
Social Transformation and Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, PO Box 875603, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA; 
email: merlyna.lim@asu.edu; merlyna@gmail.com
Recent social movements have been figuratively and digitally ignited in digital media and yet these 
movements took form, materialised and claimed power in urban public spaces. Digital media and 
physical urban spaces have become interdependent dimensions of social movements. Together, they 
can provide ‘spaces’ for people to interact for the establishment of human agency and the expan-
sion of social networks of the movements. By reading social movements spatially, this article offers to 
conceptualise the dialectical interplay between digital media and physical urban spaces in the making 
of contemporary social movements.
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The entanglement of  digital media with social movements has become a significant 
force transforming societies. Recent uprisings, from the Arab Spring to Spanish Indig-
nados, from Occupy Wall Street movements to the Malaysian Bersih, have incorpo-
rated digital media as one of  their important dimensions. However, while the new 
social movements may have been figuratively and digitally ignited in social media 
spaces such as Facebook and Twitter, the movements themselves took form, materi-
alised and claimed power far outside digital social networks. They transpired in public 
urban spaces, on the streets and in the squares. Digital media do provide new oppor-
tunities for cost-effective networking, mobilisation and diffusion of  contentions. Yet, 
a digital media-based movement is rarely an end in itself. Rather, a new means of  
providing existing social movements with a new layer of  space where (communication 
and information based) non-corporeal activities can take place. Digital media and 
physical urban spaces have become interdependent dimensions of  social movements. 
Together they can provide ‘spaces’ for people to interact for the establishment of  
human agency and the expansion of  social networks of  the movements. How, then, 
should we conceptualise the relationship between digital and urban spaces in the 
making of  contemporary social movements?
There are many studies devoted to the democratising potential of  digital media 
and the role of  the Internet in facilitating transnational and global movement (Ayres, 
2005; Bennett, 2003; Della Porta et al., 2006; Fisher et al., 2005; Juris, 2008). In studying 
movements’ tactics and strategies, the Internet has been applauded for its capability 
to facilitate movements to transcend national boundaries (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
2001; Walgrave et al., 2008). Yet, there are very few studies that link digital media 
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with ways that movements are created, expressed, lived and experienced spatially and 
locally in physical settings. Further, studies that delve into the linkages between digital 
and urban spaces in the formation of  social movements and collective action – with 
notable exceptions (Castells, 2012; Marolt, 2008; Calhoun, 2007; Lim, 2002; 2003; 
2006) – are a rarity. 
Across the humanities and social sciences, the past three decades have witnessed 
‘a spatial turn’, a shift towards geographically sensitive work with attentiveness to 
context, difference and the pre-eminence of  locale. Built on the work of  sociologists 
of  space, such as Simmel, Foucault and, especially, Lefebvre, Marxist thinkers, such 
as Harvey, Soja, and Massey and others, reintroduced a spatial consciousness in social 
sciences and established a central place for spatial analysis in social theory. Space is 
socially produced and serves as a tool of  thought and of  action, as a means of  produc-
tion, control, domination and power (Lefebvre, 1991, 26). Since space, knowledge 
and power are necessarily related, ‘it is somewhat arbitrary to try to disassociate the 
effective practice of  freedom by people, the practice of  social relations and the spatial 
distributions in which they find themselves. If  they are separated, they become impos-
sible to understand’ (Foucault, 1984, 246). The implication of  the intricate relationship 
between space and power is important to social movement research. Social movements 
are about the engagement of  power. They entail social processes and relations that 
are spatial as well as historical. Space is, therefore, not merely a container of  activism, 
but it ‘constitutes and structures relationships and networks […]; situates social and 
cultural life including repertoires of  contention; is integral to the attribution of  threats 
and opportunities; is implicit in many types of  category formation; and is central 
to scale-jumping strategies that aim to alter discrepancies in power among political 
contestants’ (Martin and Miller, 2003, 144–45). In discussing contentious politics, a 
term that has come to replace ‘social movements’ within sociology, spatiality is useful 
to ‘analyse the ways in which geography matters to the imaginaries, practices and 
trajectories of  contentious politics’ (Leitner et al., 2008, 158). The articulation of  
spatial analysis in debates spanning the studies of  social movements and geographies 
of  activism more generally is entrenched in two perspectives: one is grounded in a 
territorial framework ‘where locally bounded grievances are articulated into wider 
collective’; the other is rooted in a relational framework which ‘emphasises a fluid 
politics of  place where the interconnected nature of  political action is brought to the 
fore’ (Davies, 2012, 273). While seemingly contradictory, some scholars (Davies, 2012; 
Nicholls, 2009; Leitner et al., 2008) suggest that it is essential to engage these two 
related frameworks and to employ spatial concepts that embody both frameworks, 
such as territory, scale and networks, in interrogating empirical processes of  social 
movements (Davies, 2012). 
Manuel Castells (2004), who views network society as being structured and built 
around digital networks, argues that contemporary networks of  movements can 
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transcend the barrier of  space and time and thus can challenge the space-time-bound 
power relations. The ability to connect to the Internet, Mitchell (2003, 144) argues, has 
‘profound implication for the locations and spatial distributions of  all human activi-
ties that depend, in some way, upon access to information’. However, while perpetu-
ating new spatial structure, network society à la Castells is not necessarily placeless. 
The networks connect specific places, spaces that acquire meaning through identity 
politics in certain moment in time, to specific information and communication flows. 
In examining the Egypt revolt in 2011, Castells (2012, 61) argues that the Internet 
revolution ‘does not negate the territorial character of  revolutions throughout history. 
Instead, it extends it from the space of  places to the space of  flows’. 
In his assessment of  Castells’ Network Society, Marolt (2008) observes that Castells 
‘recognises the importance of  describing empirical changes in our experience of  space 
and time’. Citing Lefebvre (1991, 129), Marolt (2008) concurs that social relations in 
the network society have a social as well as a spatial existence. People’s experiences 
are very much embedded in ‘where’ they live, work, play and interact. While ‘the 
“network” has been identified as dominant organizing principle for society, individ-
uals continue to craft identities on their own, with one foot in their physical and the 
other in their virtual everyday lives’ (Marolt, 2008, 118). In this regard, people are 
going online without supplanting themselves from their places, where their bodily 
experiences are rooted. By reading social movements spatially, as spatial networks that 
engage both physical urban and digital media spaces, this article puts forward a spatial 
analysis to scrutinise the relationship between movements, urban space and digital 
media. By so doing, this article also offers to conceptualise the dialectical interplay 
between digital media and physical urban spaces.
Civic spaces, social networks and the spatial networks of 
social movements
The association between urban space, digital media space and movements can be 
understood in relation to networks. Social movements, especially in the form of  
protests, can also be understood as networks of  people who share a common objec-
tive and/or a common enemy (opponents) and come together in a series of  public 
display of  expression. Diani (1992) envisages social movements as social networks of  
informal and formal organisations. By treating movements as networks, we make the 
relationship between movements and their spatial location explicit (Diani, 2000). 
There are three ways to look at the importance of  networks in social movements. 
First, social networks are where social movements originated and are built up upon 
foundations. Second, social networks are where a (local) contention is communicated, 
expressed and disseminated widely to a large audience and potential participants. And 
third, contemporary social movements, unlike an individual (and often locally isolated) 
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spontaneous protest, are networks of  various contentious politics and/or geographi-
cally dispersed actions that are associated with each other based on solidarity and 
collective identity. 
Traditionally and historically, social movements are built upon existing social 
networks located in specific physical and cultural spaces. Social networks here are 
‘social systems with abstract and concrete relationships’ (van Dijk, 2001, 4). They 
are formed among individuals with similar jobs connected by networks of  unions/
organisations, or similar beliefs connected by networks of  religious organisations or 
similar interests connected by interest/hobby organisations. Such social networks are 
typically formed in physical places as well. In these networks, people interact with 
each other socially and, over time, build a sense of  unity, solidarity and a collec-
tive identity. In times of  crisis, whether social, political or economic, people turn to 
such networks to communicate their grievances and, eventually, seek opportunities to 
change the situation collectively. 
Decline of physical civic spaces 
In contemporary urban life, however, spaces in which traditional ways of  social 
networking take place have increasingly disappeared. Modernisation and rapid urban-
isation have drastically transformed urban life, turning cities and towns into gigantic 
dwelling places where people no longer live together as a community. Modern societies 
have increasingly developed under the logic of  neoliberal capitalism, where spaces 
and times are colonised and commoditised by capital. Financial anxiety, increased 
time pressure, increased work hours, moral panics and increasing inequalities are 
products of  neoliberal logic and policies that make up the very structure of  societies. 
This logic is materially translated and reflected in the spatial structures of  contempo-
rary cities, where spaces are organised and structured based on the accumulation of  
capital at the expense of  social cohesion. Increasing social stratification and inequali-
ties are manifested in struggles over public space leading to the re-zoning of  the parks 
and the squares – making them part of  a residential, rather that public zone – or the 
exclusion of  the ‘undesirable’ through regulations and physical designs (Harvey, 1990).
Under this logic, civic spaces, ‘those spaces in which people of  different origins 
and walks of  life can co-mingle without overt control by government, commercial or 
other private interests, or de facto dominance by one group over another’ (Douglass et 
al., 2002, 5), have become spatial lacunae of  the modern city. Commercial establish-
ments alone do not always cause the decline of  civic space and social connectedness. 
Traditionally, many of  these commercial places took on the role as a civic space where 
all kinds of  people would gather not only to dine, drink or do other activities associ-
ated with such places but also to engage in conversations with friends, neighbours 
and strangers at affordable costs and limited commercial impositions (Douglass et al., 
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2008, 11). The coffee shop and the pub in North America and Europe are examples 
of  such places. In Japan, sento, the privately owned public bath house, was a civic 
space where people gathered not only to bathe but also to interact with each other. In 
the aggressive commercial development of  the 1980s bubble economy ‘public baths 
were targeted as a “block busting” technique by land developers who would buy and 
demolish them to break down community solidarity against the loss of  housing to 
commercial buildings’ (Douglass et al., 2008, 11). In 1990s, there was only a handful 
public baths left in central Tokyo (Douglass, 1993). 
A similar story is happening in the Philippines, where shopping malls and supermar-
kets continue to displace sari-sari stores. Sari-sari, a small variety store that provides basic 
food items and other necessities at economically sized quantities, has been a constant 
feature of  residential neighbourhoods in the Philippines and has become an integral 
part of  every Filipino’s life (Magna Kultura, 2011). More than just a store, sari-sari is also 
a place to hangout, chat and play. A typical sari-sari store provides benches in front of  the 
store where men would spend some time drinking and women discussing the latest local 
news and gossip. Following afternoon playing sessions, children would stop there to buy 
snacks and take a rest. The number of  sari-sari in Metro Manila declined from 750,000 
in 1975 (The Economist, 1996) to only 80,000 in 2009 (Magna Kultura, 2011). 
The desire for economic growth has shifted the notion of  development from the 
public to the private realm where ‘exurban corridors, office parks, business campuses, 
privately-planned residential communities and outlying commercial centres ... 
[containing] impressive concentrations of  office jobs and hotel space account for 
extremely high volumes of  retail sales, but they have no parks, libraries or police 
forces’ (Knox, 1993, 2). The spatial configuration has significant social implications 
in our everyday life. All social endeavours require appropriate spaces (Lefebvre, 1991, 
59). In other words, the decline of  civic space is equivalent to the decline of  social 
networks that bond similar people and bridge diverse people with social reciprocity 
and mutual trust – decline of  social capital (Putnam, 2000). 
Digital media as social networks and social space
Digital media, especially social media such as Facebook and Twitter, has become 
integral to the rhythms of  everyday mundane sociality. Digital media, particularly 
social networking platforms, has about networking and networks of  people. In today’s 
world where public spaces and physical cultural spaces no longer retain their function 
as dominant social space, digital media plays important roles in nurturing daily 
sociality where concrete and abstract relationships, strong and weak ties, are formed. 
Regrettably, the importance of  new/social media networks intensifies concurrently 
with the deterioration of  traditional social networks and the disappearance of  public 
and civic spaces from urban settings.
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Admittedly, social space produced in digital media operates under the very same 
logic of  neoliberal capitalism. Social media, such as Facebook, is not free from market 
forces. It is, in reality, a technological product of  the industrial mechanisms provided 
and sustained by venture capital and capitalist investment. And yet, its value and 
power derive from the participation of  its many users. Social media epitomises the 
expansion of  the digital economy that has exploited the free labour of  individual 
subjects. Participation in social media must be understood in relation to ‘defining 
characteristics of  contemporary capitalism – namely its user-focused, customised and 
individuated orientation’ (Palmer, 2004, 1). 
Civic spaces can be created in such commercial environments, although the 
personal and collective experiences in this environment might always be on the 
verge of  commodification. Rather than creating an authentic juxtaposition of  the 
civic and the commercial, it may reflect a pseudo-heterotopia of  consumerism (Foucault, 
1986). Social media networks do not inherently generate civic spaces, let alone an 
ideal public sphere where people communicate rationally and converse in meaningful 
public deliberation (Lim and Kann, 2008). Social media is social. For urban middle-
class youth, these social media networks are spaces where they are immersed in the 
everyday mundane sociality – to express themselves, interact with each other, flirt, 
play and have fun – none of  which is readily categorised as part of  civic engagement. 
And yet, to a certain degree social is political and vice versa, allowing for these new 
social networks to facilitate and amplify ‘a culture that helps establish a foundation, 
a training ground and a learning space for individuals to express their opinions, to 
exercise their rights and to collaborate with others’ (Lim, 2013a, 19). This participa-
tory culture can be employed for civic engagement and, potentially, be borrowed for 
meaningful participation in social movement networks. 
The very reality of  contemporary urban social networks has a direct implica-
tion to recent social movements. Recent protests in Tunisia, Egypt and Malaysia 
(Bersih 3.0) were first kindled through social media networks, which are integrated 
into daily practices of  sociality. This means that individuals were, first, connected 
to each other socially, not by political association. Most of  the Facebook users who 
joined protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis and 
the Kuala Lumpur streets were first-time protesters. They joined social media 
for social purposes; the majority of  them were neither political activists and nor 
political to begin with. Dissents and protests were propagated through the already 
existing social networks – spaces where people communicate socially and culturally 
and participate in collective cultural production – rather than through networks of  
political activists. 
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Establishing spaces and networks of social movements
Social movements are not spontaneous endeavours. They emerge in complex historic 
conditions, evolve and are formed gradually through the everyday building and 
expansion of  social networks and spaces of  resistance, a growing diffusion of  collec-
tive contentions and increasingly articulated and collectively framed claim-making 
acts (Bogad, 2005, 47). The making of  social movements, first and foremost, is about 
how to inspire and mobilise people to collectively challenge the status quo and create 
change. The implication of  this is that a non-crisis situation does not provide a fertile 
ground for establishing social movement networks as people have no or little reason for 
change. Sometimes, however, a sense of  non-crisis is not a reflection of  the actuality 
but a result of  a systematic attempt to render injustice, inequalities and contradictions 
invisible. 
Hidden transcripts and subaltern counterpublics
How do social networks generate a social movement in a repressive milieu? James 
C. Scott (1990) in his book Dominations and the Arts of  Resistance argues that even in the 
repressive environment people can still build networks for potential social movements 
through the covert making and nurturing of  a hidden transcript. As opposed to a public 
transcript, in which interactions between dominators and their subordinates are open 
and public, Scott (1990, 4) uses the term hidden transcript for the critique of  power 
that takes place offstage and cannot be seen or heard by power holders. These are 
‘speeches, gestures and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in 
the public transcript’ and materialise in the forms of  stories, rumours, complaints, songs 
and artworks, among others (Scott, 1990, 4–5). 
In systems where the state controls information, such as China, Egypt, Tunisia, 
pre-reformasi Indonesia and, to a certain degree, Malaysia and Singapore, spaces 
where hidden transcripts can be articulated and nurtured are limited. Paradoxically, it is 
the practice of  domination, of  control and repression, that creates the hidden transcript. 
The more severe the domination is, the more pressing the need to produce a hidden 
transcript. Alternative views need an alternative space. The subordinates thus need an 
alternative space to the dominant bourgeois public sphere to create 
venues in which to undertake communicative processes that were not, as it were, under 
the supervision of  the dominant group … to articulate and defend their interests … 
[and] to expose modes of  deliberation that mask domination by absorbing the less 
powerful into a false ‘we’ that reflects the more powerful. (Fraser, 1997, 81) 
Fraser (1997) calls this subaltern counterpublics, which are ‘a necessary precursor to the 
launching of  the powerful social movement’ (Bogad, 2005, 48). 
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Historically, religious spaces, as exemplified by churches in the Black movement 
in the United States, mosques in the Iranian revolution and temples in the Korean 
movements, can take on the role of  sites for subaltern counterpublics. Similarly, secular 
places such as universities and labour unions can also become such sites, shown by the 
University of  Belgrade in the Serbian Otpor (anti-Milosevic) movement and Korean 
universities and labour unions throughout decades of  struggles towards democratic 
governance. Additionally, communal rituals and routines in the forms of  chanting, 
singing or dancing, among others, can also be sites for transcripts of  resistance to be 
created, communicated and practiced. Practices of  the Ghost Dance, the circle dance, 
were believed to have contributed to Lakota resistance. In nineteenth-century New 
Orleans, Congo Square, a gathering place where ‘dancing, singing, the drumming 
and the oral tradition of  story telling all came together and were performed’ (Rodri-
guez, 2007, 153), was a vital space for West African slaves and their Indian allies, not 
only for cultural expression, but also for their quest of  freedom. 
However, in the contemporary urban setting, such sites have become a rarity or, if  
they do exist, they operate under the dominance of  particular identity politics making 
these spaces inaccessible to diverse publics. Under authoritarian regimes, universities 
are policed, controlled and depoliticised and labour unions are destroyed. Communal 
activities have generally disappeared, displaced by commercialised individual endeav-
ours. In the event that physical spaces are commodified, repressed and/or impossible, 
digital media can potentially facilitate activists to form subaltern counterpublics needed in 
the fostering of  hidden transcripts.
In Tunisia, where the Arab Spring in many ways began, online hidden transcripts 
can be found as early as 2001 in TuneZine, the first known online political forum of  the 
country. Satirical by nature, this Zine (a play on the words magazine and Zine Ben Ali, 
the President) became the space where Tunisians discussed taboo political issues such 
as human rights, economic problems, freedom of  expressions and religion (Strohl-
Grun, 2003). Under the Ben Ali dictatorship, satire was found, in part, on the radio 
and on the streets. But political satire took a new life and was rejuvenated through the 
participatory culture of  social media. Youssef  Cherif  (cited in Villa, 2001), a Tunisian 
student, testifies: 
Satirical anecdotes were common to Tunisia, even though not as open [as now]. We 
always had jokes about the ‘cop-president and his hairdresser wife,’ [but] I am not sure 
if  these radio shows had political impact ... The big impact comes from the Facebook 
pages that disseminate pictures and videos (old or new) and that are touching the 
population. 
In Egypt, one example of  a hidden transcript is found in the form of  ‘We are all Khaleed 
Said’ Facebook group devoted to the political martyr Khaleed Said, who was beaten 
to death for his efforts to spread awareness about police brutality and corruption (Lim, 
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2012). This group, triggered by the anger of  the death of  Said, allowed thousands of  
Egyptians to freely discussed issues of  human rights, state oppressions and democ-
racy that were otherwise taboo. Many of  them, including one of  the administrators, 
used ‘fake’ Facebook usernames. Digital media enable its users to practice a politics 
of  disguise and anonymity, which, according to Scott (1990), is part of  infrapolitics, in 
which the narrative of  the hidden transcript is communicated in public, or in an overlap-
ping space between private and public. 
Yet, there are limits to the activists’ ability to disguise their identities. In some 
countries, the government routinely cracks down on Internet activism. After the 2009 
Iranian revolt, the Iranian government arrested and detained many online activists. 
Sattar Beheshti, a Green Movement blogger who frequently criticised the regime, 
despite not using his full name on his blog, was tracked down and arrested. He later 
died in custody, reportedly as the result of  the torture he endured during the inter-
rogation (Contributor, 2012).
In the recent anti-corruption movement in Indonesia, called ‘Gecko vs Crocodile’, 
a hidden transcript was cultivated in digital media, particularly through the usage of  
Facebook and YouTube, in the form of  visual political satire and humour. The ‘Gecko 
vs Crocodile’ movement refers to a 2010 Facebook-driven movement that was used by 
Figure 1 Fake movie poster 
for the ‘Gecko vs Crocodile’ 
movement in Indonesia
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Indonesians to support anti-corruption deputies, symbolised by a gecko, in their fight 
against the Indonesian Chief  Police detective, symbolised by a crocodile (Lim, 2013a). 
The hidden transcript was found in a large amount of  amateurish artwork devoted to the 
movement: digital posters, cartoons, animations, songs and video compilations. Most 
of  the artwork made use of  the icon – a gecko and a crocodile – as their central themes. 
One of  the most attractive ones is a digital piece that resembles a movie poster, titled 
‘When a Gecko Testifies’ (see Figure 1). This slick and professional-looking poster 
showcases all ‘actors’ related to the case and points out that they are part of  the mega 
soap-opera of  Indonesian politics (Lim, 2013a). 
Digital space does not invent hidden transcripts. This space, however, can emerge 
as an alternative space where the nurturing of  hidden transcript in physical space has 
become difficult to sustain due to the control by and crackdown of  authorities. A 
sociologist, Cherian George,1 in looking at a digital media-driven movements in the 
2011 Singaporean Election, argues that the relative success of  oppositional movements 
in the recent election can be attributed to their ability to continuously develop the 
hidden transcripts through social media.
By providing spaces for subaltern counterpublics, digital media helps citizens of  Egypt, 
Tunisia and Malaysia to ascertain the possibilities of  resistance through everyday 
practices, thus providing room for identity politics. In Foucault’s term (1980), this kind 
of  struggle in seemingly unimportant sites is called ‘local resistance’. While seemingly 
benign this medium has the potential to become an instrument for oppressed individ-
uals and groups to temporarily escape from the normalising process of  society and to 
foster more autonomous means of  collective identity (White, 1991). 
Framing the narrative
As space and networks, digital media can be utilised to create subaltern counterpublics and 
nurture hidden transcripts. It is not, however, inherent to successful activism. While we 
can create as many Facebook movement groups as possible, there is little likelihood 
that any of  these online movements would be translated into a meaningful social 
movement. Lim’s study of  Facebook activisms in Indonesia shows that the majority of  
movements created on Facebook failed to gain a significant number of  followers (Lim, 
2013a). Participatory culture in social media belongs more to the realm of  popular 
culture and, thus, it is limited in its ability to facilitate political mobilisation. These 
limitations are derived from three circumstances, as follows (Lim, 2013a, 19): 
First, in social media, the network is vast and the production and circulation of  infor-
mation is constantly accelerated. This environment is more genial to simple and/or 
1 A keynote presentation at the International Conference on Social Media Culture in Yogyakarta, 22 September 
2011.
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simplified narratives than complex/complicated ones. Second, social media is not 
independent from the large media system. Social media activism, thus, needs to attune 
with ‘the incredible shrinking sound bite’ culture of  mainstream media. Third, social 
media is not detached from its techno-material aspect, namely the distribution and 
device of  its access. With a high concentration of  social media access in urban areas, 
the narrative of  activism always competes with entertainment content tailored for 
urban middle-class consumers. Furthermore, a high proportion of  users access social 
media from mobile devices that are tailored for the quick bite experience.
In social media, activists need not only to ‘construct a cultural frame, or set of  impas-
sioned, shared meanings, that justify and motivate collective action’ (Tarrow, 1998, 
21) but also to mould the narratives of  movement to fit the nature and limitations 
of  social media. In studying social movements, scholars employ the concept of  frame 
to explain how meaning is constructed to legitimise collective identities and actions 
(Gamson, 1992). Frame, a term coined by Goffman (1974), refers to schemata people 
use to organise perceive and make sense of  their experience in the world (Snow et 
al., 1986, 464). By rendering events meaningful, frames function to organise and guide 
actions (Snow et al., 1986). Frames for collective action perform this function by simpli-
fying reasons and rationales for participation. Beyond usual social movement framing, 
to be successful in social media, movements need to frame themselves to impersonate 
successful viral stories in mainstream popular culture, namely to employ simplified 
narratives that embrace the principles of  contemporary culture of  consumption: light 
package, headline appetite and trailer vision (Lim, 2013a).
To illustrate this dynamic, it is useful to visit some empirical examples. In Indone-
sian context, the two most prominent and successful social media campaigns are 
‘Gecko vs Crocodile’ and ‘Coins for Prita’ movements. The latter refers to the story 
of  Prita Mulyasari, a 32-year-old mother of  two, who fought for justice after being 
prosecuted for libel for complaining about the service at a private hospital in an email 
to her friends and relatives. In this story, tens of  thousands of  Indonesians joined a 
support page for Mulyasari on Facebook, shared their outrage on Twitter and donated 
money to pay her court fine. While representing complex problems, these two cases 
were framed in social media in much simpler narratives. Both were framed as simple, 
non-ideological archetypal stories of  hero vs villain through victimisation-framing 
that identifies specific villains whose actions purportedly threaten weaker or smaller 
individuals or groups. This framing reflects a popular framing used in Disney culture 
and folktales that does not incite any dissonance, morally or ideologically (Lim, 2013a). 
Such framing has been a part of  social movement struggles throughout history. 
A comparable case is also exemplified in the Tunisian revolt through the story of  
Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. In this story, Bouazizi, a street vendor who 
never finished high school, was ‘framed’ as an unemployed university graduate who 
was slapped by a female police officer, even though nobody knew whether the slap 
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really happened. This victimisation-framing, supported by the powerful symbolism of  
Bouazizi’s burning body images, culturally and politically resonated with the entire 
population and fired up the resistance of  the highly educated urban middle class 
youth (Lim, 2013b).
Staging the movement in digital and urban spaces
Even with the emergence of  digital media-driven social movements, public demon-
strations are still very part of  social movements. Even though ‘some feel that the 
public demonstration is obsolete – that public space no longer exists, or that power 
is now too fluid and dispersed to be contested by gathered masses of  people’ (Bogad, 
2005, 52), staging the movement in urban public space is still perceived as the most 
powerful way to collectively express dissent, to express the strength of  the movement 
and, especially, to directly challenge the dominant power. Such public demonstration 
can also be a tool to grow the movement (to attract new participants) and to define 
collective identity for a group/culture/movement.
Visible and invisible, present and hidden 
Social movement effectively consolidates by its invisibility (being invisible to the authority 
or the opponent); the vast and convivial digital media provides the space for this mecha-
nism. In contrast, it should claim its power but its visibility (being visible to the authority 
or the opponent) through public display of  resistance, which can only be materialised 
by either ‘occupying’ public space and/or ‘opening’ public space. Manoeuvring in both 
digital and physical urban public spaces, the movement can control when and where it 
appears and disappears. Power is everywhere and is indispensable in any social construct 
(Foucault, 1980). While it is not possible to erase power or to oppose the knowledge/
power relationship in which the movement actors produce and participate, the ability 
to be visible and invisible – present and hidden, alternating between online and offline spheres 
– creates a possibility for a movement to articulate its own view, identity, subjectivity and 
its own emancipation project through online and offline practices. 
Digital media spaces and networks can be used to propagate new narratives, new 
messages, new ideas that challenge the authority. However, symbolic representation of  
power is grounded in the memories and histories of  public spaces. While the cultiva-
tion of  the movement, especially when physical spaces are repressed, may effectively 
take place in the digital media spaces, ‘the revolutionary contingent attains its ideal 
form not in the place of  production, but in the street’ (Virilio, 1977). The existence of  
symbolic physical insurgence spaces is, therefore, significant to the staging process of  
social movement. In this context, occupied spaces are identified through meanings, 
symbols, narratives and histories associated with the space. 
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The control of  space, argued Castells (2012), symbolises the control over people’s 
lives. By occupying the public space, people symbolically challenge that control and 
construct ‘a free community … as a space for sovereign assemblies to meet and to 
recover their right of  representations’ (Castells, 2012, 11). The mass movement, the 
people movement, becomes a symbolic power when bodies come together, make a 
claim and be visible in the eyes of  the public. It is the staging of  social movement in 
public space that translates the movement into a visual power, a spectacle of  political 
bodies. The scene of  millions people occupying Tahrir Square of  Cairo, Tiananmen 
Square of  Beijing, Monument National of  Jakarta or Dataran Merdeka in Kuala 
Lumpur, is symbolically powerful. Further, the literal spectacle of  people power, in 
itself, is a form of  power that disputes the existing power relations embedded in the 
materiality of  the public space. Politics requires the polis, the space of  appearance, 
where one appears to others as others appears to one and where they together exist to 
make their appearance explicitly (Arendt, 1958, 198). The capacity to act in concert 
for a political purpose, to create the polis, is what Hannah Arendt (1958) calls power. 
Intermodality: connecting online (digital media) and offline (urban space)
In translating the movement to the mass protest in physical public space, coordina-
tion and mobilisation are crucial. How to coordinate individuals and groups before 
the movement spills out to the physical spaces and while on the streets or squares is 
significant in defining the position of  the movement vis-à-vis the power holder (state 
authorities).
In its realisation from online to offline, contemporary urban movement relies 
not only on the digital media. It has to go beyond digital media spaces, especially 
when the online population is only a small segment of  society, as in Indonesia, Egypt, 
Tunisia and other developing countries. In Indonesia, the Philippines and in Egypt, 
mobile phones and the more traditional media were extensively used on the ground 
to communicate and coordinate the actions. Here we see the importance of  the inter-
modality, namely the linkages from the Internet and social media to other networks 
(Lim, 2003). 
In the 1998 reformasi in Indonesia as well as in more recent (Facebook-driven) 
movements in 2009–2012, digital media was crucial, but was not the sole source 
of  support for the movements. In 1998 movement, activists had to make online-
based information available for a wider range of  society by transforming it into 
readable print material, reproducing this print material by fax and photocopier and 
disseminating it to a vast audience. Activists and students had to work together with 
newspaper sellers, street-vendors and taxi drivers to make information originating 
from the Internet available to society at large. With this process of  information 
dissemination from cyberspace to the streets, in March to May 1998, the informa-
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tion about the wealth of  Suharto was disseminated all over the country. The avenues 
ranged from Internet users going to newspaper sellers to kiosk owners and trishaw 
drivers and through these means it finally reached people from all strata and classes 
(Lim, 2002; 2003).
A similar scenario was also evident in Philippines with the overthrow of  Presi-
dent Estrada in January 2001. In the week running up to the crisis, President Estrada 
managed to escape from impeachment by the Senate by devious methods (as it seemed 
to his opponents). This created uproar, and the Internet suddenly became a popular 
space to talk about this matter. Here the Internet became the main source of  infor-
mation that drove and stimulated resistance toward Estrada. However, rather than 
use the Internet for organisation and mobilisation, Filipinos relied more on mobile 
phones and text messages (Rafael, 2003). In the week of  the resignation there were 
80 million text messages being sent per day (Bagalawis, 2001). A large number of  
messages were jokes about Estrada, something that had already become a habit over 
the previous weeks. However, text messages also were very useful in organising mass 
protests at short notice so it would be difficult for authorities to handle or respond in 
time. This way the protesters could organise quickly and in remarkable numbers. In 
the Philippine case, the mobile phone with its text message service provides an impor-
tant ability to be an extension of  the Internet to reach more people (Rafael, 2003). As 
in Indonesia, the linkages between the Internet and mobile phones and other media 
were proven to be very powerful.
A similar pattern is also found in the more recent case in the Tunisian revolt (Lim, 
2013b). When the massive protests broke out in Thala and Kasserine, two border 
towns near Algeria, the government isolated the towns and cracked down the protests 
with brutal massacres. But the information could not be prevented from leaking out. 
In the towns that had no reliable Internet connection, protesters took videos with 
mobiles and pocket cameras documenting police brutality and passed these videos to 
activists. Activists transferred the files to memory cards, put the cards inside sneakers 
and threw the sneakers over the border to Algeria, where the files would find their 
way to reach Algerian activists who forwarded them to their peers in Tunis and some 
eventually got to Al Jazeera’s news desk (Lim, 2013b). The intermodality of  the low and 
high technologies had propelled the massacres in the isolated towns that would other-
wise remain a local account into a national and global affair. 
The critical matter in the cases of  Tunisia, the Philippines and Indonesia is that 
the intermodality has created a hybrid network and a hybrid space where the digital 
space and the urban space are networked and overlapped. Castells (2012, 11) calls this 
a space of  autonomous communication that allows a movement to be formed and 
enables it to relate to society at large by by-passing the control of  the power holders 
over communication power. 
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Preset and mobile spaces and networks
Contemporary urban movements increasingly revolve around the combination of  
fixation and mobility. Fixed nodes of  urban spatial networks in tandem with mobile 
ones are used together for recent movements. In the Tahrir revolt, taxi drivers were as 
important as Facebook, taking advantage of  the fact that ‘taxi drivers couldn’t stop … 
talking’ (Rashed in Lim, 2012, 243). The April 6th Youth Movement activist Waleed 
Rashed told a story that since 15 January 2011 he started ‘informing’ taxi drivers about 
the 25 January protest (Lim, 2012, 243):
Every time I was in a cab, I would call Ahmed on my cell phone and talk loudly about 
planning a big protest in Tahrir Square for January 25th, because I knew that they 
couldn’t stop themselves talking about what they’d overheard. Eventually, on January 
23rd, a cabbie asked if  I’d heard about this big demonstration that was happening in 
two days.
The story is similar to what happened in Indonesia with the overthrown of  Suharto 
in 1998 (Lim, 2002) and subsequent protests (Lim, 2006). In Jakarta, two social 
groups among the larger society were identified as the ones that had speedy access to 
information on urban protests. First were taxi drivers, who always knew where the 
students/activists would hold street protests as they would like to avoid the traffic jams. 
The drivers would seek for more details about the protests to engage passengers in 
conversations. Some taxi drivers in Jakarta claimed to receive stacks of  photocopied 
information from students/activists to be freely disseminated to passengers in 1998 
movement. According to some taxi drivers, in those days of  student demonstrations, 
the taxi-radio was frequently used to spread information about the demonstrations 
(Lim, 2003; 2006). 
The second group consisted of  the food stall/kiosk (warung) owners around the 
universities where student activists live and carry out their activities. They would chat 
with students at breakfast, lunch and dinner times. These ordinary people, mostly from 
lower and lower-middle classes, developed sympathy with the students by listening to 
their gripes and occasionally supplied food. Political as well as daily rumours and 
gossip were spread to, from and among the warung. The taxis and the warung thus 
became sub-hubs of  networks of  information flows (Lim, 2003; 2006).
In Tahrir, in addition to the Cairo taxies, friendly coffee shops that are common 
in downtown Cairo played a significant role as a point of  information dissemina-
tion (Lim, 2012, 243). The cabs and the coffee shops are among the most important 
urban artefacts where the social fabric of  urban society finds its nexus. The combina-
tion of  taxis and coffee shops, similarly of  taxis and warung in Indonesia, also repre-
sent the preset and the mobile modes of  communications and information networks. 
From the taxis, the coffee shops and other alternative hubs, the information reached 
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many people both at the nucleus and the fringes of  urban areas. Thus, the traditional 
network of  information was awakened. The political resistance developed by a small 
group of  young activists, the social media elites, was disseminated to a wider urban 
society.
Sustaining the movement, physically and virtually
Beyond coordinating, activists also have to sustain the movement. In a repressive 
society, the sustaining process includes a set of  strategies to survive the crackdown 
and physical attacks from the authorities. Any public demonstration aspect of  social 
movement is no longer about ideas and flows of  information, but it involves physical 
bodies in physical space. The strategy thus is about claiming the physical urban space 
and surviving it. 
In the Cairo protest, Tahrir Square itself  ‘is based on a concentric overall plan 
that that offers wide open spaces for thousands to gather’ (Al Saleh and Arefin, 2011): 
If  downtown were simply a grid system, the protesters could easily be dispersed with 
little hope of  finding a similarly welcoming place to reassemble. But centres such 
as Talaat Harb and the 6th of  October Bridge allow mass numbers to congregate 
and parade down boulevards greeted by giant metal statues of  long-dead Egyptian 
revolutionaries. At the same time, the system that allows reassembly also denies it. The 
downtown streets, wide and spacious, can accommodate the easy passage of  riot vans, 
large armoured vehicles and water cannons, unlike other parts of  Cairo. (Al Saleh and 
Arefin, 2011) 
In the Tahrir movement, activists strategised around the physicality of  the square 
and informed people on how to manage the physical encounters with police forces by 
distributing a 26-page manual the night before 25 January 2011 (see Figure 2). This 
manual provided know-how to collectively ‘win’ the movement in real physical space, 
Tahrir Square. How to physically respond to the physical barriers, how to see the 
movement as a physical manoeuvring and adventure, as well as a physical encounter, 
are among the core messages of  the manual.
In comparison, in the Malaysian Bersih 3.0 movement in Kuala Lumpur, Twitter 
was used not only to coordinate the protests but also to provide a spatial guidance 
for participants in manoeuvring the physical coercion by the Malaysia police force. 
While Twitter helped to globalise the Bersih 3.0 protests (see Figure 3), the majority 
of  tweets come from Malaysia with a high concentration of  tweets in Kuala Lumpur, 
Johor Baru and Penang (see Figure 4). A closer look at the geotagging map shows that 
central Kuala Lumpur (see Figure 5), where the protests took place, generated the 
highest number of  tweets, such as in areas around Dataran Merdeka, Masjid Jamek, 
Sulta Abdul Samad building, Strait Trading building, Pasar Seni, Jalan Raja and Jalan 
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Figure 2 A sample page of the 
26-page Tahrir protest manual
Translation (Arabic to English):
Steps for Carrying Out the Plan
1. Assemble with your friends and 
neighbours in residential streets far 
away from where the security forces 
are.
2. Shout slogans in the name of Egypt 
and the people’s freedom (positive 
slogans).
3. Encourage other residents to join 
in (again with positive language).
4. Go out into the major streets in 
very large groups in order to form the 
biggest possible assembly.
5. Head toward important govern-
ment buildings, while shouting 
positive slogans, in order to take 
them over.
Tun Perak. Twitter was heavily used to exchange information about places. Among 
the most frequently used words were names of  places such as ‘Dataran Merdeka’ 
and ‘Masjid Jamek’ and references to place-based activities and atmosphere/situa-
tion such as: ‘walk to’, ‘escape’, ‘run from’, ‘turn right’ and ‘turn around’. When 
police fired tear gas and water cannon to disperse the crowd gathered at the Dataran 
Merdeka, mobile phones and Twitter were used to assist protestors to find alternative 
routes out of  the police barricades. Because protesters can easily use Twitter with 
their smartphones, Twitter use has made digital and street activism, digital and urban 
spaces, more seamless, interlocking. 
Beyond sustaining the movement in public space, the movement should also be 
a spectacle beyond its physicality. The globalisation of  the movement, therefore, is 
important. In the Bersih 3.0 case, Twitter was used to connect various protest sites all 
over the world and to globalise the movement. Similarly, in the case of  Tahrir, activ-
ists reached a global audience through Twitter, Al Jazeera and large media outlets 
such as CNN and BBC to globalise the movement and win international support to 
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Figure 3 (top) Global geotagged map of Bersih 3.0 tweets, 28 April 2012, 01:00–7:00pm (source: 
author)
Figure 4 (above left) Kuala Lumpur, Johor Baru and Penang geotagged map of Bersih 3.0 tweets, 
28 April 2012, 01:00–7:00pm (source: author)
Figure 5 (above right) Central Kuala Lumpur geotagged map of Bersih 3.0 tweets, 28 April 2012, 
01:00–7:00pm (source: author)
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protect and sustain the uprising (Lim, 2012). Social media, especially Twitter, and 
global media allowed a worldwide audience to listen to the voice of  the people rather 
than the governmental authority’s point of  view. 
While the corporeal, bodies, are protesting on the streets and in the squares, 
their actions are recorded through communication technologies (e.g. mobile phones, 
smartphones, pocket cameras, television cameras) and broadcasted in electronic space 
through Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and television channels. Bodies in online and 
offline spheres are mutually linked; together they create a contemporary public sphere 
where the movement continues to galvanise the resistance to challenge the hegemony.
Conclusions
Through analysis of  social movement as spatial networks in both urban and digital 
media spaces, this article recognises that ‘space is fundamental in any exercise of  
power’ (Foucault, 1984, 252). Social movements can be understood as the act of  
questioning of  the nature and exercise of  power in society. Therefore, it is logical that 
studies and analyses of  contemporary social movements should not be detached from 
our understanding of  the importance of  both digital media and public urban spaces 
as social, cultural and political spaces and networks. 
The importance of  digital media in the formation of  social movements cannot be 
separated from the reality of  contemporary urban conditions marked by the disap-
pearance of  public and civic spaces, the deterioration of  traditional social networks 
and the decline of  social capital. In contemporary urban life, social media emerges 
as social space that operates under the logic of  capitalism and, yet, is nurtured by 
sociality and participation of  its users. Social media is neither agent for change nor a 
harbinger of  democracy. It a pseudo-heterotopia of  consumerism and is not inherently 
political. Yet, participatory culture that is nurtured in social media may potentially be 
employed to establish and sustain social movements. 
Beyond providing new opportunities for cost-effective networking, mobilisation 
and diffusion of  contentions, digital media space enables the subordinates to cultivate 
hidden transcripts and create subaltern counterpublics needed to the launching of  the powerful 
social movement. It provides existing social movements with a new layer of  space where 
non-physical activities – communication- and information-based – can take place and 
for a network of  movement to be invisible from control and repression. However, the 
actual realisation of  power, people power, is only visible through public staging and 
demonstration in public urban spaces. The intermodality between digital media, people’s 
social networks and other media, big and small. Examples from cases presented in this 
article include taxis, coffee shops, warung, mobile phones, memory cards and sneakers, 
and these all makes it possible to create a hybrid network and a hybrid space for social 
movements to symbolically and materially challenge the hegemonic power. 
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For contemporary social movements, digital media and physical urban spaces have 
become inter-reliant. Both, interchangeably and complementarily, can facilitate not 
only the making of  insurgent movements, but, further, to provide ‘spaces of  hope’ 
(Harvey, 2000) for ‘we the people’ to engage with power and exercise political agency. 
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